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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops an approach to the analysis of cross-listing that brings together the financial 
and non-financial benefits of the phenomenon. We employ the real options framework, which 
offers a detailed characterisation of the strategic issues associated with cross-listing, in the 
context of internationalisation of emerging market firms. The associated hypotheses are tested 
using firm-level data from four large emerging market economies with different profiles in terms 
of institutional quality and financial development. This allows us to extend the existing literature 
by isolating the relative importance of institutional quality and financial development for the 
benefits of cross-listing.  
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1. Introduction 
Why do firms decide to cross-list? The theoretical model posited by Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (2006) shows that if there are two types of firms, one of which is more advanced and 
hence with lower information costs, and has to signal this, cross-listing can be an important 
signalling mechanism. It can reduce the importance of country-specific institutional quality at 
home (specifically, with respect to formal institutions such as investor protection) and enable 
firms to overcome limitations of country-level institutions by leveraging their firm-level 
governance quality (Doidge et al., 2007).1 This has specific implications for firms based in 
emerging market economies that generally have both capital market imperfections and weak 
investor protection, and may be associated with adverse selection in developed and global capital 
markets (Herrmann et al., 2015).  
The international finance approach to this question focuses narrowly on cost of capital 
advantages (Stulz, 1999), that may then be reflected in higher firm valuation (Karolyi, 1998). 
The limited engagement of the international business (IB) literature with the cross-listing 
phenomenon focuses on the advantages associated with “bonding” with institutions in a different 
context, especially where firms from relatively weak institutional contexts decide to cross-list in 
relatively strong institutional contexts (Peng et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, there 
have been no attempts to incorporate the international finance and IB approaches to cross-listing 
by carefully distinguishing between the signalling and bonding attributes of the phenomenon.  
We argue that the real options framework is able to anchor the motivation and ability of 
firms to attain and retain a cross-listing, and also facilitate a clear distinction between signalling 
                                                 
1
 Unsurprisingly, in this literature, there is a lot of emphasis on the cross-listing of foreign firms on the US stock 
market, indicating the strong signalling effect associated with a US listing by non-US firms (see for example 
Alexander et al. (1988), and the literature which follows their work). Pagano et al. (2001), for example, find that 
European firms seek larger and more liquid markets, with better investor protection and institutional quality, and 
hence their attraction for cross-listing in the US. 
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and bonding. It is now well understood that the real options framework,2 offers invaluable 
insights into how firms “design operational solutions to market frictions” (Mahoney and Qian, 
2013; pp. 1024), where market frictions include factors such as informational opacity and 
institutional weakness. The first and main contribution of this paper, therefore, is to develop a 
strategic and integrated narrative concerning the motivations and ability to cross-list, and 
benefits associated with signalling and bonding by leveraging this framework. 
This narrative provides the basis for our hypotheses which we test using firm level data 
from four emerging market economies that are large and economically important. Indonesia, 
Mexico and South Africa are part of the BRICS and MINT groups of countries, while Poland is a 
major former socialist economy at the heart of new Europe. These countries are representative 
geographically, and illustrative of the development paths of their region. At the same time, they 
offer significantly different dimensions of governance.  
Our choice of countries also extends our analysis to encompass the literature on emerging 
market firms and the development of emerging market multinational enterprises (EMNEs), 
reflecting our second contribution. Initial work in this area explained the existence of EMNEs by 
“country specific advantages” (CSAs) such as economies of scale on account of large domestic 
markets (Ramamurti and Singh, 2009). More recently, it has been argued that in order to 
internationalise, emerging market firms may need complementary firm specific advantages 
(FSAs), in the form of higher profitability and internal financial resources (Bhaumik et al., 2010; 
Bhaumik et al., 2015a, 2015b). However, with very few exceptions (Stulz, 1999; Peng and Su, 
2014), little has been said about the rationale for capital market based internationalisation via 
cross-listing, and how this form of internationalisation can help in turn the internationalisation of 
                                                 
2
 Real options theory highlights the strategic aspects of taking managerial decisions under uncertainty (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). 
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emerging market firms. We therefore explore how cross-listing can amplify the combinations of 
FSA and CSA available to emerging market firms.  
Finally, the real options framework speaks to the well documented corporate governance 
challenges faced by emerging markets firms. In the face of certain institutional and financial 
voids, successful firms in emerging markets develop certain internal capital and labour market 
solutions that have adverse implications for governance quality within firms (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000a; Young et al., 2008; Globerman, Peng and Shapiro, 2011). This has been 
recognised in the IB literature (Bhaumik et al., 2010), and our paper further integrates corporate 
governance of emerging market firms into the narrative concerning their internationalisation. 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on cross-listing and derive 
our hypotheses using the real options framework. Next, we explain our multistage empirical 
research design and describe our data sample and variables. We then present our results. This is 
followed by a conclusion where we discuss the implications of our findings with regards to 
advancing the literature on cross-listing by emerging market firms and outline limitations of this 
paper which may offer avenues for future research. 
2. Literature review on cross-listing  
Much of the literature on cross-listing is focused on market reactions (Karolyi, 1998). It 
focuses on firms from various countries that seek to obtain cross-listing in New York, and 
generally finds a positive relationship between cross-listing and share prices, both in the short 
and long term (Lang et al., 2006; Roosenboom and Van Dijk, 2009; Miller, 1999). Capital 
market based globalisation can reduce the cost of capital because of greater ability of 
international investors to diversify away non-systematic risk (Stulz, 1999). Furthermore, cross-
listing provides more information to the firm, in part generated through comment from external 
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analysts (Herrmann et al., 2015), and in part through the market view to its opportunities 
(Foucault and Gehrig, 2008). This, in turn, enables them to make better investment decisions.  
However, there is also a recognition about the signalling effects of cross-listing, and the 
benefits associated with the change in perception about a firm’s corporate governance quality 
that cross-listing may trigger (Doidge et al., 2007; Abdallah and Goergen, 2008; Peng and Su, 
2014). Specifically, if informationally opaque firms are generally not well governed then it 
becomes difficult for a single firm to prove that it is better governed than its competitors. This 
can result in adverse selection problems for investors (Akerlof, 1970), and consequently market 
failures that shut even relatively well governed firms out of the capital market. Signalling in this 
context is an act that can change the perception of the investors about the governance quality of 
the company, as they can distinguish between “good” and “bad” firms (Spence, 1973).  
The more recent literature on cross-listing has extended the discussion about signalling – 
which is largely a response to problems of informational asymmetry or opacity – to encompass 
the related issue of institutional legitimacy. Bell et al. (2012) and Peng and Su (2014) argue that 
cross-listing may pave the way for greater legitimacy for emerging market firms, more by way of 
“reputation bonding based on informal institutions” than by way of the formal institutions. This 
perspective is consistent with the argument that a number of emerging market firms desire to 
“escape” weak institutions in their home country, and engage with more robust ones, in order to 
establish a credible risk-return trade off and potentially seek lower cost sources of finance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014). It is also consistent with the analysis by Doidge et al. 
(2007) who argue that country level protection of investors is crucial to ambitious firms, and that 
of Coffee (2002) who argues that by cross-listing in the US foreign firms “partially compensate 
for weak protection of minority investors under their own jurisdictions’ laws” (pp. 1757). Much 
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less discussed in the literature are the longer term benefits of bonding such as amelioration of 
liability of foreignness (LOF) (Zaheer, 1995). Subsequently, this facilitates deeper or greater 
internationalisation, including strategic partnerships with and technology transfer from firms in 
relatively developed institutional settings, as trust between the partners is facilitated by bonding. 
Overall, therefore, the literature has moved primarily in three different directions. First, 
and most commonly, it has focussed on the impact of cross-listing, in particular on firm value 
and on the cost of capital of cross-listed firms. The second strand of the literature is about the 
importance of the signalling effect of cross-listing, focussing on the corporate governance quality 
of the cross-listed firms. Third, there has been an attempt to explore the implications of cross-
listing for the ability of firms to embed themselves in the better institutional environment of the 
countries where they decide to cross-list. It is evident from this literature that cross-listing has 
strong strategic elements, and can enable a firm’s management to use it to create value for a firm 
both in the short run, by reducing its cost of capital, and also in the long run, by giving it greater 
legitimacy to investors who are concerned about corporate governance quality and (potential) 
stakeholders in other (generally better) institutional contexts. This is a similar argument to the 
one made by Siegel (2009) in the analysis of strategic alliances by Mexican firms with US firms. 
Building on earlier literature – see, for example, Siegel (2005) – this line of argument is that 
bonding needs to be considered in a wider context, with the need for a greater understanding 
between a firm’s bonding strategy, and its governance. In turn this widens the discussion from 
the literature which merely focuses on financial performance, and seeks to examine the 
importance of bonding using a wider set of dimensions. However, an integrated theory about this 
strategic aspect of cross-listing is missing in the literature and, as we have discussed in the 
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previous section, contributing towards the development of a unified framework for discussion of 
cross-listing from a strategic standpoint is perhaps the most important contribution of this paper. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development  
An emerging market firm’s decision about cross-listing is shaped by the trade-off 
between the cost of revealing more about the firm to external agents and the signalling benefits 
associated with such exposure. The costs may be greater for firms that are informationally 
opaque, but the benefits can be high if they are able to signal their governance quality. Once the 
decision to become (and remain) cross-listed is made, there are some immediate and visible 
benefits in the form of greater access to (perhaps cheaper) capital from deeper capital markets. 
There are also potential gains from bonding with a better institutional context, such as the 
amelioration of LOF of its overseas operations, and strategic partnerships with and technology 
transfer from overseas firms. Unsurprisingly, the benefits of bonding might be less for emerging 
market firms that already have somewhat strong institutions.  
A unified framework about cross-listing should, in other words, be able to explain the 
choice to become (and remain) cross-listed on the basis of anticipated net benefits, and be able to 
demonstrate ex post benefits associated with cross-listing. Since benefits of cross-listing may be 
anticipated but costs incurred to facilitate cross-listing are immediate, the theory should also take 
into account the ability of firms to bear this ex ante cost. Also, the decision to cross-list is 
strategic and hence a unifying discussion about cross-listing should proceed from a strategic 
perspective. We seek to develop such an approach using the real options framework (Bowman 
and Hurry, 1993; Klingebiel and Adner, 2015) as the centre piece for this strategy-based 
discussion. We propose that the real options analysis of cross-listing, within the context of IB, 
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ties together the different strands of the literature in order to take account of the various strategic 
decisions involved in cross-listing. Our framework is highlighted in Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 1) 
 Following Bowman and Hurry (1993), the interpretation of Figure 1 is as follows. Firms 
strategize about internationalisation which is dependent on both the ability and the motivation to 
internationalise. As we argue later in the paper, motivation depends on the firm’s informational 
opacity and, correspondingly, corporate governance quality. Its ability to internationalise 
depends, at least in part, on firm specific advantages (FSAs) such as financial resources 
(Bhaumik et al., 2010). The cross-listing literature discussed above highlights the fact that cross-
listing itself can be achieved with little commitment of resources by the firm. However, as we 
discuss later in the paper, for some firms the ex-ante cost of the requisite restructuring of 
governance can be high or even prohibitive. Once the firm is cross-listed, it can benefit directly 
through lower cost of (or greater access to) capital (Stulz, 1999), and indirectly by bonding with 
a developed institutional context (Bell et al. 2012; Peng and Su, 2014). Greater access to lower 
cost of capital, in turn, increases the ability of a firm to internationalise.  
In the longer run, the cross-listed firm can deepen its internationalisation by leveraging its 
bonding, i.e., exercise the so-called “call” option. Building on Siegel (2009), bonding is expected 
to give a cross-listed firm greater legitimacy with respect to its congruence with corporate 
governance and other institutions in another (generally, more developed) context, and thereby 
ease its LOF. However, should the benefits of bonding prove to be insignificant or smaller than 
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bonding effects of alternative mechanisms such as strategic alliances (Siegel, 2005, 2009),3 the 
firm may choose to not deepen its exposure to the host country further but continue to enjoy 
benefits such as lower cost of capital. Finally, if prospects of further internationalisation are 
weak and the gains from lower cost of capital are not significant relative to the cost of being 
transparent then it can exercise the “put” option and delist from the overseas capital market. 
Cross-listing is, in the words of Bowman and Hurry (1993), the “real option”. It may also 
be considered, as argued by Banalieva and Robertson (2010), a distinct form of entry reflecting 
increasing commitment (but short of a full FDI-based commitment) to the host country, and local 
partners. Firms from weak institutional environments that are uncertain about their ability to 
internationalise through FDI use this relatively low cost option (with the caveat discussed above) 
to gain access to global capital markets and to bond with stronger institutional contexts, in 
anticipation of (albeit with no obligation to) greater internationalisation. Figure 1 therefore 
illustrates the full characterisation of a strategy associated with internationalisation, with cross-
listing as an intermediate step. It not only pulls together the literatures related to signalling, cost 
of capital and bonding, but also explicates the corporate governance aspect of cross-listing by 
way of the relationship between informational opacity of a firm and its motivation to cross-list.  
We first explore the issue of motivation of firms to cross-list. As such, cross-listing 
requires firms to be more transparent and demonstrate good corporate governance and the cost of 
(re-)organising themselves in this manner is likely to be high for firms that are opaque and not 
well governed. The cost is likely to be fairly high for informationally opaque firms with and 
weak governance structures that are ubiquitous in emerging market economies (Khanna and 
                                                 
3
 Using a set of Mexican firms, Siegel (2005) explores the use of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) as a 
bonding mechanism, but concludes that these are not as effective as other forms, for example strategic alliances 
(Siegel, 2009). 
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Palepu, 2000b; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Gibson, 2003). This informational opacity is often 
manifested in lack of clarity about the ownership structures of these firms (Bebchuk et al., 2000), 
and is believed to result in expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 1999). The IB literature has discussed the implications of such opacity for 
internationalisation through financial markets and outward FDI (Bhaumik and Driffield, 2011; 
Chung et al., 2015). 
However, precisely because firms that are informationally opaque are known to have 
high agency costs, such that they are more likely than other firms to be associated with adverse 
selection, cross-listing and the associated signals can benefit these firms more than others. In the 
emerging market context, for example, where ownership concentration is ubiquitous (Bhaumik 
and Selarka, 2012, and references therein), business groups and firms affiliated to them are 
considered to be particularly opaque (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Claessens and Fan, 2002).4 In 
part, this is on account of their ability to control firms through a maze of cross-holding of shares 
and cross-membership of company boards (Bebchuk et al., 2000), and, in part, this is on account 
of their ability to move assets and earnings across firms using mechanisms such as tunnelling 
(Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). Firms from emerging market economies, where the institutional 
weaknesses at the country-level, especially with respect to investor protection, considerably 
increase the benefits associated with cross-listing, it is likely that relatively opaque firms will 
have greater incentive to cross-list. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a. Informational opacity of a firm is positively related to the likelihood of its cross-
listing. 
                                                 
4
 The term “Business Group” has particular connotations in terms of emerging market economies, relating not just to 
cross holdings, but to use of internal capital and labour markets. This is distinct from the use of the term within the 
context of the global value chains literature; see for example Altomonte and Rungi (2013) who use the term in the 
context of hierarchies between parents and affiliates.  
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 However, an opaque firm has other ways to signal its quality, in particular, because 
governance quality (managers and entrenched controlling shareholders working in the interests 
of the firm rather than for their own private benefits) and firm capabilities/performance are 
generally positively correlated (Klapper and Love, 2004, Cuervo-Cazzura and Dau, 2009). 
Hence, firms with higher profitability and cash flow have less need to signal good governance 
through cross listing, as they are able to signal performance directly. This leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1b. The motivation for cross listing in the presence of informational opacity is 
weaker when a firm is able to signal good governance quality through its financial capacity.  
Financial capacity not only permits informationally opaque firms to signal their 
governance quality, they directly affect a firm’s ability to cross-list. As noted by Bhaumik et al. 
(2010) and references therein, firms in weak institutional settings often develop governance 
structures and mechanisms for dispute settlement that are informal, often aligned through family 
relationships and dominant entrepreneurs. Cross-listing in developed countries however requires 
that these firms have established internal structures to process strategic decisions transparently, 
and the capacity to deal with strategic, legal and regulatory issues across international 
boundaries. For many of these firms, the associated cost of restructuring may be high or even 
prohibitive; see, for example, a discussion about restructuring needs of family firms in Bhaumik 
and Dimova (2014). Specifically, as demonstrated by Bhaumik et al. (2010), emerging market 
firms that are large and profitable, with large cash flows, have greater capability to 
internationalise, perhaps because they have greater ability to bear any cost of reorganisation and 
restructuring that is necessary to be attractive to investors in a different (generally better) 
institutional context. This is consistent with findings that suggest that a firm’s resources have an 
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impact on their cross-listing (Pagano et al., 2002; Bailey et al., 2006). This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s financial capacity and its 
likelihood of cross-listing.   
We now turn to the directly observable (or tangible) benefits from cross-listing that result 
from signalling. To recapitulate, signalling theory suggests that such signalling can lead to 
“separating equilibria” whereby investors are able to distinguish between well governed and 
poorly governed firms. Once a firm is able to signal its governance quality in some way – 
through cross-listing, for example – they are rewarded by the capital market. Doidge et al. 
(2007), for example, argue that controlling shareholders of cross-listed firms have lower 
incentive to consume private benefits associated with their position. Evidence from the corporate 
governance literature supports the narrative about the relationship between signalling (better) 
governance quality and cost of capital (see Healy and Palepu, 2001). The signalling benefits of 
cross-listing were discussed early by Stulz (1998). The subsequent literature on information 
benefits of cross-listing – e.g., Fernandes and Ferreira (2008); Bailey et al. (2006), and Sami and 
Zhou (2008) – is also consistent with this signalling-cost of capital relationship, even though it 
suggests that the impact of cross-listing on the cost of capital may differ by choice of overseas 
exchange (Hail and Leuz, 2009). This signalling effect is reinforced by ex post actual monitoring 
in more reliable (or multiple) regulatory jurisdictions. These advantages are supplemented by the 
portfolio effect, whereby the lower expected risk-adjusted returns of global investors reduce the 
cost of capital of these cross-listed firms.  
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Our main proposition is that cross listing improves a firm’s ability to access external 
capital, and reduces its cost of capital. In turn, the beneficial signalling effect is higher for ex 
ante informationally opaque firms. Cross listing communicates the firm’s willingness to submit 
itself to scrutiny, and therefore signals superior governance quality compared with its peers.  One 
can make similar arguments concerning the ability of an emerging market firm to attract foreign 
investment. We argue therefore however that the beneficial effects of cross listing and attracting 
foreign investment are multiplicative. Firstly, the signalling effect associated with both events is 
greater, in that they both demonstrate the ability to overcome the liability of foreignness in 
international capital markets. Secondly, incumbent foreign ownership may further ameliorate 
financial constraints by attracting more overseas investors who are wary about investing within 
the domestic domain of the cross-listed firm but are more willing to invest in it within the 
context of cross-listing that have stronger (or at least more familiar) institutions. Further, if 
foreign ownership is perceived to be correlated with phenomena such as technology transfer 
(Driffield et al., 2014) there are positive implications for future performance that can also lead to 
even greater access to capital from overseas shareholders. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a. Cross-listed firms will experience reduced financial constraints compared with 
their non-cross-listed counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3b. The positive relationship between cross-listing and reduction in financial 
constraints will be stronger for informationally opaque firms.  
Hypothesis 3c. The positive relationship between cross-listing and reduction in financial 
constraints will be stronger for firms with foreign ownership.  
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Our final hypothesis concerns the more intangible benefits from cross-listing, namely, 
bonding. Bonding with a stronger overseas institutional context, can confer on the firm 
institutional legitimacy. This, in turn, can result in greater access to capital in the short run, and 
carries with it benefits such as amelioration of LOF and access to advanced technology in the 
longer run. The longer run advantages of bonding are difficult to model empirically because 
there is little a priori theory about how long it takes for bonding to generate the full benefits such 
as amelioration of LOF. However, it is possible to argue that the ex post benefits associated with 
LOF-reducing institutional legitimacy is likely to be less for firms for which there is ex ante 
similarity between institutional environments of home country and country of cross-listing. 
Implicit in the bonding discussion is the argument that these gains are likely to be 
significant only if the institutional distance between the home country of the firm and the country 
of cross-listing is significant. For example, Hail and Leuz’s (2009) conclusion that (largely) 
European firms gain significantly by cross-listing at US exchanges but do not gain 
commensurately at the London exchange suggests that perhaps institutional distance matters. In a 
similar vein, Herrmann et al. (2015) argue that the benefits of cross-listing in the US are not 
uniform across countries, but dependent on the perceived improvement in governance quality 
from investing in the US. Alternatively, if the home country corporate governance institutions 
(e.g., investor protection) are good, the extent of “bonding” benefit resulting from cross-listing 
can be expected to be low. Reese and Weisbach (2002), for example, argue that the increase in 
equity offerings following a cross-listing is larger for firms whose country of origin is less 
effective in protecting minority shareholders’ interests. We, therefore, have the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4. Firms from home countries with good institutional quality will benefit less from 
cross-listing’s impact on access to capital than those from countries with poor institutional 
quality.  
4. Data 
It is evident from the discussion in Section 3 that the analysis requires a mix of firms that 
are cross-listed and those that are not, and that firm level characteristics (e.g., informational 
opacity and profitability) would have to be matched with country level indicators of institutional 
quality, allowing for a degree of variation at the country level as well as the firm level. We, 
therefore, focus on four emerging market economies – Poland, Mexico, Indonesia and South 
Africa – that are large and important members of the emerging market club, and yet are different 
from China and India that are much discussed and whose firms enjoy special benefits because of 
factors such as their size. 
 Table 1 shows the definitions of all firm- and country-level indicators used in our 
analysis. Information on cross-listing and other key firm-level variables come from the 
commercially available dataset ORBIS. This dataset provides detailed information on company 
profiles, including profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and other financials. These are all 
converted into US dollar equivalents for the sake of comparability across countries and deflated 
using GDP deflators from the World Bank’s World Development indicators to take account of 
inflation. Annual country-level indices come from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ database.  
(Insert Table 1) 
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 One has to be mindful about the possibility that emerging market firms that decide to 
cross-list may ex ante be different from firms that do not. This induces the classic “self-
selection” problem that must be controlled for in the analysis. The literature advocates several 
solutions to this problem. More sophisticated techniques (currently employed in the corporate 
finance literature) involve the use of matching techniques to overcome the self-selection problem 
(Kai and Prabhala, 2007). Specifically, we use the Mahalanobis matching technique. 
Conceptually, this involves identifying a “treatment” group – in this case, emerging market firms 
that have cross-listed – and matching those with untreated firms that are similar to the treated 
firms, based on a given set of criteria as specified in the “distance function”. We use the 
following dimensions to match emerging market firms with cross-listing to their non-cross-listed 
emerging market counterparts: employment (to proxy firm size), firm age, 2-digit industry and 
home country of the emerging market firms. It is important to note that “matching” does not 
mean that the treated and non-treated firms will be (nearly) identical to each other, especially if 
the matching is done along multiple dimensions. They merely lie within some pre-determined 
distance of each other, i.e., they are roughly similar along some combination of those 
dimensions.  
After accounting for missing data for relevant variables, we have an unbalanced panel of 
602 emerging market firms from Indonesia, Poland, Mexico and South Africa, covering the time 
period of 2006-2013; of these, 191 are cross-listed at overseas exchanges. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of firms across the four countries, and the extent of capital market development and 
investor protection in the aforementioned four countries. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
emerging market firms by their industry affiliation.5  
                                                 
5
 In keeping with much of the literature in this area, financial institutions and utility companies are omitted from the 
sample. 
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(Insert Table 2) 
 (Insert Table 3) 
5. Research methodology 
5.1 Drivers of cross-listing  
Our empirical exercise on the basis of Figure 1 means that for hypotheses 1(a), 1(b) and 2 
we effectively discuss the determinants of cross-listing. Some of these determinants capture the 
motivation of a firm (especially those from emerging market economies) to internationalise (and 
thereby hold a real option with respect to greater internationalisation in the future). Some others 
capture the ability of the firm to internationalise and indeed bear any cost associated with cross-
listing itself. We have argued that motivation depends on the informational opacity of firms and 
mitigating factors such as firm performance and foreign ownership.  
In keeping with similar analyses in the cross-listing literature discussed above, we start 
with a probit model to explain the probability of a firm obtaining a cross listing:  
Pr(CL)it = β0 + β1 Business Group i,t-1 + β2 (Business Group × ROA) i,t-1  
+ β3 (Business Group × CFTA) i,t-1 + β4 ROA i,t-1 + β5 CFTA i-t-1 
+ β6 Firm size i,t-1 + β7 Firm age i-t-1 + β8 LTDTA i,t-1 + β9 IATA i,t-1 +  
β10 Foreign Ownership i,t-1  + e it      (1) 
where Pr(CL) is the probability of being cross-listed in a given year, Business Group is a dummy 
variable where the firm has membership of informationally opaque business groups, offering a 
direct test to hypothesis 1a. We have two measures to proxy for a firm’s financial capacity: ROA 
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or return on assets as a measure of profitability, and CFTA as the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets. Taken together, these variables capture variation in the financial capacity of firms and 
offer a test of hypothesis 2. Testing of hypothesis 1b is facilitated by the interaction between the 
business group dummy and the two aforementioned financial measures. A number of stylised 
control variables are also used in the firm level analysis, including IATA which is the ratio of 
intangible to total assets and reflects FSAs (Braunerhjelm, 1996; Bhaumik et al., 2010); Foreign 
ownership which is a dummy equalling 1 when the share of foreign ownership is at least 50 per 
cent in the firm and zero otherwise; a firm’s age and size; and leverage (LTDTA). Finally, eit is 
the iid error term. We also control for industry, country and year effects using dummy control 
variables. The explanatory variables are lagged by one period to address potential endogeneity 
problems. Note also, with Pr(CL) as the dependent variable in the analysis, we are not discussing 
the single act or decision to cross-list but rather the continual strategic decision to remain cross-
listed during a given year, or not. We estimate the probit model using pooled data and report the 
marginal effects. 
Given that we are using multiple measures of a firm’s ability to internationalise and, 
correspondingly, multiple measures of factors that can mitigate the relationship between the 
informational opacity of a firm and the likelihood of remaining cross-listed in a given year, it is 
possible that not all the regression coefficients associated with Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2 
will be statistically significant. Among the control variables, IATA is expected to have a positive 
impact on any form of internationalisation. However, since emerging market firms often do not 
have significant FSAs and given that cross-listing may itself be a way to enhance FSA ex post 
through strategic partnerships and technology transfer, statistical significance of this variable is 
not guaranteed. Given that foreign investment in an emerging market company (and 
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correspondingly foreign ownership of shares) enhances their ability to internationalise (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000a; Bhaumik et al., 2010), we expect this control variable to have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of cross-listing as well. Firm size can be expected to have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of being cross-listed in a given year as well – larger firms are more 
likely to internationalise, but the impact of firm age on this likelihood is not as clear. On the one 
hand, older firms have significant operational experience but, on the other hand, they may be too 
optimised for one institutional and regulatory context to venture into a new context. We also 
include leverage as a control, though the impact of leverage on the likelihood of cross-listing is 
also ambiguous. While leverage is known to affect firm behaviour and is therefore a stylized 
control variable in firm-level analysis, there is little theory about the precise way in which it can 
affect the likelihood of cross-listing. 
 
5.2 Gains from cross listing  
 We now proceed to Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) and Hypothesis 4; the former are about the 
effects of signalling while the latter is about bonding. In the IB literature much of the discussion 
about the potential benefits of cross-listing concerns greater access to capital and lower cost of 
capital for cross-listed firms. In other words, where firms experience financial constraints on 
account of frictions that inhibit unfettered access to the capital market, cross-listing can help 
ameliorate the extent of financial constraints experienced by a firm. We, therefore, draw on the 
discussion about financial constraints of firms to empirically examine Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) and 4. 
The impact of signalling is easy to comprehend: cross-listing should reduce a firm’s 
financial constraints and firms with certain characteristics would benefit more than others. The 
operationalisation of Hypothesis 4, about bonding, requires further explanation. Recapitulate that 
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while most of the benefits of bonding are experienced in the long run, the discussion of which 
lies outside the scope of this paper, we focus on a specific aspect of bonding, namely, benefits 
from bonding are lower if the home country of the cross-listed firms have relatively strong 
institutions (and hence are similar to those in the country of cross-listing). This benefit of 
bonding should be reflected in the short term benefits of cross-listing, specifically, with respect 
to access to capital. As such, if the home country of the cross-listed firm has strong institutional 
quality, then its benefits from bonding (i.e., access to capital) will be less. Hence, we test 
Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) and Hypothesis 4 using the same empirical framework, that of a firm’s 
financial constraint; with Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) linked to variables that capture a firm’s 
informational opacity and Hypothesis 4 linked to the institutional quality of the home countries 
of the cross-listed firms.  
The finance literature on financial constraints of firms is largely based on the seminal 
work of Fazzari et al. (1988). One of the challenges of discussing a firm’s financial constraints is 
that it implies an excess demand for capital (at least, capital that is priced at a level that is 
acceptable to a firm) and yet we only observe the actual amount of capital at a firm’s disposal, 
not the firm’s capital needs relative to the amount to which it has access. In the literature on 
financial constraints, this problem is finessed as follows: A firm’s investment decisions should 
ideally depend on factors such as its current sales and, more importantly, Tobin’s q which is a 
stylised measure of a firm’s future prospects. If the firm has unfettered access to the capital 
market then this investment level should be independent of its internal financial resources. 
However, if the firm experiences financial constraints – it is argued – this investment level would 
also depend on its internal financial resources and in the literature the stylised measure of 
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internal financial resources is its cash flows. As such, the greater the cash flow sensitivity of a 
firm’s investment, the greater is its financial constraints. 
The advantage of this approach is its simplicity; it involves the estimation of simple 
cross-section or panel fixed effects regression models whereby the regression specification is 
given by: 
   = 
 + 
, + 
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where I is investment (i.e., annual change in capital stock), K is capital stock (i.e., fixed assets) of 
the firm, ln Q is log of Tobin’s q, S is sales, CF is cash flow, Z is a vector of other firm 
characteristics such as firm size and firm age, θ and µ are time and firm fixed effects, and e is the 
iid error term. The focus then is on the coefficient of the cash flow variable, 
. However, as 
with any cross-section or panel data regression model, estimates of equation (2) give us the cash 
flow sensitivity of the average firm, i.e., a view about the financial constraint of the average firm, 
which is not particularly satisfactory.  
In recent extensions of the Fazzari et al. (1988) methodology, therefore, Wang (2003) and 
Bhaumik et al. (2012) have proposed an alternative empirical approach which involves first 
estimating firm-specific measures of financial constraints and subsequently, regressing this 
measure of financial constraints on factors that can enhance or reduce it. The conceptual basis of 
their argument is as follows: if a firm operates in a perfect capital market and has unfettered 
access to capital then, as mentioned above, it's investment would depend only on factors such as 
Tobin’s q and sales levels. However, de facto, on account of factors such as informational 
asymmetry between investors and firms, the aforementioned firm does not operate in perfect 
capital market and hence its actual level of investment is less than this optimal level. Let us call 
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the gap between the optimal and actual level of investment “inefficiency”.6 Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) 
and 4 can be addressed within this setting, once this firm-specific measure of inefficiency is 
estimated. If cross-listing reduces financial constraints, it should also reduce this inefficiency, 
implicitly bringing the firm’s observed actual investment to its unobserved optimal investment 
level. Similarly, if benefits of bonding are less for firms from countries with high institutional 
quality, this inefficiency and home country institutional quality of firms should be positively 
correlated. 
The challenge, of course, is to estimate this inefficiency level and Wang (2003) and 
Bhaumik et al. (2012) propose a solution involving the use of stochastic frontier models 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). This approach involves estimating the equation that estimates 
the optimum level of investment that is associated with firm i’s Tobin’s q and sales levels: 
  
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and estimating the aforementioned inefficiency (u) as deviation of observed investment from this 
optimum: 
        (4) 
Thereafter, this inefficiency is regressed on the variables in which we are interested.  
In our case, this second regression equation is given by: 
( =
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6
 In our framework, this inefficiency can be zero at best, when a firm does not experience any capital market 
friction, or positive. The distribution of this inefficiency, therefore, is half-normal. 
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where u is the measure of a firm’s financial constraints, CL is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if a firm is cross-listed, such that we expect the coefficient to be negative in line with 
Hypothesis 3a, Business group is the familiar binary indicator of a firm’s informational opacity, 
which when interacted with cross-listing we expect to have a negative effect in line with 
Hypothesis 3b. Foreign ownership is also a binary indicator of foreign shareholding in a firm, 
which when interacted with cross-listing provides a direct test of Hypothesis 3c. Investor 
protection is a measure of the quality of the home institutions of a firm – we specifically choose 
investor protection that is most relevant in the context of stock market listing. Our control 
variables are firm age, total assets of a firm and cash flow; these are stylised in the literature (see 
Bhaumik et al., 2012). We have additionally controlled for the state of capital market 
development in the home country of the firms, using the stylized measure of the ratio of market 
capitatisation in the home country to its GDP, because it has implications for a firm’s financial 
constraints.  
Note that since equation (5) explains inefficiency; the greater the deviation of a firm’s 
investment from the optimum, i.e., the greater the financial constraints of the firms, the greater is 
the inefficiency. In other words, a firm’s financial constraints are reduced if inefficiency is 
lower, i.e., if an estimated regression coefficient is negative. By the same token, a positive 
regression coefficient indicates that inefficiency, and hence financial constraint, is increasing.  
5.3 Summary statistics and correlation 
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix are reported in Table 4. It can be seen 
that multicollinearity is not a problem for our set of independent variables for both the probit and 
stochastic frontier models. Most of the correlations between explanatory variables are weak, and 
VIF calculations are all below 2.5 and thus do not suggest multicollinearity problems.  
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(Insert Table 4) 
6. Results 
The first stage of our analysis explores the firm level characteristics associated with 
cross-listing, using the matching algorithm to allow for the selection process as described in the 
previous section. Table 5 presents the estimations of the probit analysis across four models. 
Model 1 tests hypothesis 1a, which captures the impact of cross-listing for a firm belonging to a 
business group. Model 2 tests hypothesis 2, which isolates the impact of firm performance, cash 
flow and intangible to total assets on cross-listing. Model 3 brings together the variables relevant 
for both hypotheses 1a and 2 and, finally, Model 4 introduces to the specification the interactions 
between the aforementioned variables that are the basis for hypothesis 1b.  
Hypothesis 1a. Focusing first on the motivation to cross list, the results provide strong 
support for the first hypothesis, Firstly, firms that are informationally opaque are more likely to 
cross list, offering support for Hypothesis 1(a). The coefficient on the business group dummy is 
positive and significant, with indicates that business group firms are between 7 and 21 percent 
more likely to remain cross-listed in a given year than other firms, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 2. Model 2 in table 5 suggests that the likelihood of being cross-listed in any 
given year increases with a firm’s performance/financial capacity (specifically, profitability and 
cash flow) that have implications for a firm’s ability to bear the cost of necessary restructuring. 
We, therefore, have strong support for Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 1b. Moving on to the interactions between business groups and financial 
performance (model 4), we also have support for Hypothesis 1b; impact of the business group 
dummy on the likelihood of attaining cross listing decreases with the ROA and cash flow of the 
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firm. In other words, if firms can signal their governance quality by other means, their 
motivation to cross-list declines.  
(Insert Table 5) 
Recapitulate that Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) and 4 are examined using the stochastic frontier 
framework whose results are reported in Table 6. The coefficient estimates for the frontier 
indicate that a firm’s investment (to capital ratio) increases with its future prospects as captured 
by Tobin’s q, while lagged sales (to capital ratio) have mixed impact on this investment. This is 
consistent with the literature on financial constraints that forms the basis for this empirical 
exercise; see Bhaumik et al. (2012). As explained using equations (3) and (4), the stochastic 
frontier model enables us to generate firm-specific measures of inefficiency that is a proxy for a 
firm’s financial constraint. Hypotheses 3(a)-(c) and 4 are related to this inefficiency equation 
(Equation 5). In Table 6, we first introduce the variables related to hypotheses 3(a)-(c) in the 
inefficiency equation (Model 1), and thereafter, we introduce the variables related to hypothesis 
4 (Model 2). Finally, we add the control variables to the specification for the inefficiency 
equation (Model 3). It is evident that the estimates are robust across these specifications.   
Hypotheses 3(a)-3(c). The regression coefficients for the inefficiency equation suggest 
that inefficiency is lower for cross-listed firms, and that this inefficiency decreases even further 
for business group affiliated firms and those with incumbent foreign shareholders. Lower 
inefficiency, of course, is associated with lower financial constraints and indirectly, therefore, 
with access to cheaper and more abundant capital. In other words, the signalling effect of cross-
listing reduces financial constraints, and this effect is stronger for ex ante informationally opaque 
business group affiliated firms, and firms that already have foreign shareholders who can help 
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attract even more overseas investment upon cross-listing. We, therefore, have strong support for 
our signalling related hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4. Finally, we discuss our hypothesis about bonding. The relevant regression 
coefficient reported in Table 6 suggests that for cross-listed companies the benefit in terms of 
lower financial constraints is progressively offset with increase in the quality of investor 
protection (and, by extension, institutional quality). Indeed, for an average value of 6 for investor 
protection for a country-year, well over half the beneficial impact of cross-listing (in terms of 
inefficiency reduction and hence lower financial constraint) is offset. We, therefore, have support 
for our bonding related hypothesis as well. However, as we have mentioned earlier, in our 
analysis we have abstracted for long term advantages of bonding that are reflected not so much 
in lower financial constraints (and greater access to cheaper capital) but in reduced LOF, greater 
scope for strategic partnerships with overseas firms, and technology transfer from developed 
country firms.  
(Insert Table 6) 
 
Robustness checks 
With regards to the results reported in Table 5, the pseudo R-square values associated 
with the models exceed 0.40, which is fairly good for this type of data and empirical analysis. 
The results are qualitatively (i.e., in terms of sign and statistical significance) unaffected by the 
introduction of new variables into the specification, and are robust to controls for observed and 
unobserved firm characteristics and time related factors. Likelihood ratio tests, not reported in 
the paper, suggest that the specification that includes the control variables dominate those that do 
not. We are particularly encouraged by the robustness of hypotheses 1a and 1b to the inclusion of 
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LTDTA (or leverage) in the specification because it nets out, to a large extent, the internal capital 
market aspect of business groups that aids access to capital, such that the business group dummy 
reflects, as such, opacity and governance quality. We also experimented with interactions 
between the business group dummy, and measures of FSAs, intangible assets and foreign 
ownership. These however were insignificant, while the model is robust to their inclusion. They 
are therefore omitted. 
Similarly, the results reported in Table 6 are robust to incremental expansion of the 
specification for the inefficiency equation. Note also that we estimate the frontier and 
inefficiency equations jointly which addresses a major inconsistency that plagues models in 
which these equations are estimated in two stages (Coelli, 1995). Specifically, if the model is 
estimated in stages then inefficiency effects are assumed to be iid while in the second stage they 
are assumed to be determined by firm-specific factors such that they are not iid by definition. We 
have followed Kumbhakar et al. (1991), and the subsequent extension of their model to panel 
data by Battese and Coelli (1995), in modelling inefficiency (or market friction) explicitly as a 
function of firm-specific variables. Note further that the functional form of the frontier equation 
is consistent with the stylised literature on financial constraints (Wang, 2003; Bhaumik et al., 
2012).7 Our model therefore is well specified from an econometric point of view and this adds to 
our confidence about our model estimates. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper shows that firm-level indicators and the country-specific institutions explain 
why certain emerging market firms cross-list. We demonstrate that cross-listing is beneficial, 
                                                 
7
 At this point in the estimation process, if one were estimating productivity, there would be a need to explore 
alternative functional forms to test whether returns to scale restrictions in the “production function” were valid  
(Coelli, 1995). With our specification and dependent variable this is not a concern.  
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particularly for emerging market firms who are located in countries with lower levels of investor 
protection, and those that are perceived to be informationally opaque. Our findings contribute to 
the wider IB literature, by combining insights drawn from the IB and finance literatures and 
applying it to four emerging economies.  
Our results contribute to the current debate on how emerging market firms can 
internationalise, and in particular overcome LOF, that are particularly acute for firms from 
countries with weak institutions. Firstly, we argue that LOF applies in capital markets as well as 
in goods markets, and that cross-listing can be an important solution to this for firms from 
emerging markets. Here, the signalling hypothesis dominates. In order for firms to fully exploit 
their FSAs in new markets, finance is required, with both debt and equity finance being more 
readily available in more developed markets, and at lower cost. For such firms, we show that 
FSAs are important in explaining their internationalisation and in particular in explaining their 
cross-listing activities.  
Secondly, our results extend this argument, and link the analysis of cross-listing to the 
burgeoning literature on EMNEs. Initially, our findings lend support to the recent edited volume 
of Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014), and other recent literature on EMNEs (Williamson, 
2014, Bhaumik et al., 2015a, b), which highlight the heterogeneity that exists within emerging 
market firms, particularly in terms of their ability to generate FSAs. As such, the argument 
expressed by Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti (2014) that EMNEs are to a degree “escaping” the 
weak institutional environment in their home country, can also be applied to capital market 
conditions, and cross-listing is an important tool for doing this. However, we can extend this 
argument to the other main constraint faced by emerging market firms, which is access to 
technology. Whether it is through partnering with established country firms, seeking investment 
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from abroad, or seeking technology agreements with more advanced firms, bonding assures the 
partner of good governance practices including the protection of intellectual property. As such, 
bonding can play an important role in the long term development and internationalisation of 
emerging market firms. 
Limitations and further avenues of research  
Our findings suggest a number of avenues for further research into cross-listing, and the 
integration of analysis of capital markets within IB research. Firstly, while we have shown that 
the advantages of cross-listing are a combination of signalling (access to finance) and the 
intangible benefits associated with bonding, further research should consider the relative 
importance of cross-listing for firms seeking debt and those seeking equity, and the importance 
of this in facilitating internationalisation by emerging market firms. 
An unanswered question however concerns the role that cross-listing might play in the 
internationalisation of the firm more generally. Does cross-listing for example lead to firms 
engaging in higher levels of exporting or FDI as bonding potentially reduces a firms’ LOF? 
Equally, as we have shown that FSAs are important in explaining cross-listing, and its benefits, 
does cross-listing offer an additional location advantage, and in turn amplify the returns to 
further internationalisation through FDI?  
It should also however be noted that, in contrast to some of the finance based literature 
above, we have focussed deliberately on emerging market firms, rather than say a full set of 
firms who have chosen to cross list in a given location. This has some inherent advantages, in 
that we do not combine firms from countries with highly developed institutions and capital 
markets (for example Germany or the UK) with firms from developing countries. The theory and 
literature discussed above would suggest that the benefits of cross listing will be greater for 
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emerging market firms than for say UK firms, such that previous work may have understated the 
average benefit. However, at the same time, the limitations of focussing on emerging markets 
should be recognised in terms of exploring the benefits of cross listing per se. 
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Figure 1. Opportunities and benefits of cross-listing 
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Table 1. Variable definition 
Variable name Variable description 
Dependent variables  
Cross-listing  This is a dummy variable equalling 1 if an emerging market firm lists stock in at least one foreign 
stock market outside its home market and zero if it does not. 
Investment to capital ratio  A firm’s ratio of annual investment to its capital stock, where capital is defined as the stock of fixed 
assets and investment is defined as the annual change in the fixed assets. 
Independent variables  
Business group  This is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm belongs to a business group and zero if it does not. 
ROA A firm’s return on assets drawn from the balance sheet account. 
CFTA A firm’s annual level of cash flow over total assets 
Foreign ownership  This is a dummy equalling 1 if the share of foreign ownership is at least 50% in the emerging 
market firm and zero if it is not.  
Investor protection This is an index from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. It shows, for each country, the 
strength of investor protection as the average of the extent of disclosure index (i.e. transparency of 
transactions), the extent of director liability index (i.e. liability for self-dealing) and the ease of 
shareholder suits index (i.e. shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct). The 
index ranges from 0-10 with higher values indicating more investor protection. For more details 
about the methodology used for this indicator, visit http://www. 
doingbusiness.org/methodologysurveys/. 
Tobin-Q Ratio of a firm’s market value to book value 
Sales to capital ratio Ratio of sales to capital 
Control variables  
Firm size The natural logarithm of total number of full time employees of the firm. 
Firm age The age of a firm calculated since year of when the company has been incorporated. 
LTDTA A firm’s annual level of long term debt over total assets 
IATA All intangible assets over total assets. Intangible assets include formation expenses, research 
expenses, goodwill, development expenses and all other expenses with a long term effect. Total 
assets are defined as fixed assets plus current fixed assets. Both items are drawn from the balance 
sheet account.  
Assets A firm’s annual level of total assets 
Cash flow A firm’s annual level of cash flow 
Market cap to GDP A countries’ annual market capitalisation of listed firms to GDP (Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators) 
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Table 2. Distribution of Emerging Market Firms across countries and cross-listings, 2006-2013 
 
Country Investor 
Protection 
 
 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Market cap of 
listed firms to 
GDP 
 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Ease of 
accessing local 
equity market a 
 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Total Number of 
firms  
Number of firms 
that cross-list 
Number of firms 
that cross-list in 
major exchanges b 
Number of firms 
that cross-list in 
other developed 
market exchanges c 
Indonesia 5.75 (0.31) 40.23 (11.11) 4.93 (0.66) 219 81 49 79 
Mexico 5.71 (0.76) 36.53 (7.62) 3.79 (0.63) 33 17 16 15 
Poland 5.96 (0.11) 34.55 (10.69) 4.10 (0.51) 235 13 12 9 
South Africa 8.00 (0.00) 208.10 (62.30) 5.46 (0.51) 115 80 39 76 
Total    602 191 116 179 
Note: a This is an index measuring ease of accessing a local equity market, taken from the Global Competitiveness Report, prepared by World Economic Forum (WEF). 
               b Major exchanges are New York, London, Frankfurt, Zurich, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
          
c
 Other developed markets are defined as all other exchanges in developed countries.  
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Table 3. Industry Distribution of EMNs across countries and cross-listings 
Sector Indonesia Mexico Poland South Africa 
 Non cross-
listing firms 
Cross-
listing firms 
Non cross-
listing firms 
Cross-
listing firms 
Non cross-
listing firms 
Cross-
listing firms 
Non cross-
listing firms 
Cross-
listing firms 
Agriculture 2 7 0 0 1 0 2 2 
Mining 6 13 0 2 1 1 2 6 
Manufacturing 79 28 8 5 72 5 11 36 
Construction 4 1 0 2 24 1 0 5 
Wholesale/Retail 8 9 1 5 49 2 4 11 
Transportation 12 4 0 0 7 0 1 5 
Accommodation 6 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 
Information Technology 9 8 3 1 26 3 8 6 
Real Estate 8 6 0 0 5 1 0 1 
Professional Services 2 2 1 0 23 0 2 0 
Administrative Services 2 1 1 0 5 0 2 5 
Educational Services 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Health Services 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 
Arts sector 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 
Total 138 81 16 17 222 13 35 80 
40 
 
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variable Mean a Std. dev. a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) ROA 
 
3.84 
 
14.13 
 
1 
          
   
(2) Firm size 4420.38 
 
14268.56 
 
0.08*** 
 
1 
         
   
(3) Firm age 22.51 
   
23.55 
 
0.11*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
1 
        
   
(4) Intangible 
to Total Assets 
0.05  
   
0.12 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
-0.06*** 
 
1 
       
   
(5) Cash flow 
to Total Assets 
0.11 
    
0.13 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.03** 
 
1 
      
   
(6) Long term 
debt 
0.12 
    
0.21 
 
-0.10*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
-0.06*** 
 
-0.04*** 
 
0.10*** 
 
1 
     
   
(7) Tobin-Q 1.12  
 
1.25 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.11*** 
 
1 
    
   
(8) Sales to 
capital 
1.13   
  
1.00 
 
0.10*** 
 
0.00 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.01 
 
-0.03* 
 
-0.15*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
1 
   
   
(9) Cross-
listing 
0.33 
 
0.47 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.33*** 
 
0.22*** 
 
0.02 
 
0.03** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
-0.06*** 
 
1 
  
   
(10) Investor 
protection 
6.21   0.82 0.11*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 
 
 
0.17*** 
 
 
0.06*** 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.05*** 
 
 
-0.01 
 
 
0.30*** 
 
 
1 
 
   
(11) Business 
Group 
0.13 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.06*** -0.03** -0.02 -.04*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.02* 
 
 
0.08*** 
 
 
1   
(12) Foreign 
ownership 
dummy 
0.10 0.30 0.01 -0.04** -0.04*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** 
0.00 
 
-0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** 1  
(13) Market-
cap-to-GDP 
62.34   63.77 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.11*** -0.01 0.33*** 
 
 
0.88*** 
 
 
-0.08*** -0.08*** 1 
Note: The mean and standard deviation is shown for the matched sample of firms.
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Table 5. Determinants of cross-listing  
Dependent variable  =1 for cross-listed firms; =0 otherwise Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Hypotheses 1a (motivation to cross list)   
Business Group (t-1) 0.079**  0.072** 0.227*** 
 
(0.040)  (0.040) (0.059) 
Hypotheses 2 (ability to cross list)     
ROA (t-1)  0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CFTA (t-1)  0.304*** 0.302*** 0.428*** 
  (0.102) (0.102) (0.106) 
Hypotheses 1b (enhanced motivation)    
ROA (t-1) * Business Group (t-1)    -0.005* 
    (0.003) 
CFTA (t-1) * Business Group (t-1)    -1.029*** 
    (0.301) 
Control variables      
Log Firm size (t-1) 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Firm age (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LTDTA (t-1) 0.131*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.184*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) 
IATA (t-1) 0.271** 0.363*** 0.372*** 0.389*** 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.134) (0.134) 
Foreign Ownership (t-1)    -0.002*** 
    (0.001) 
Wald chi-square 803.610 892.200 900.190 873.930 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.453 0.460 0.461 0.469 
Log pseudolikelihood - 828.987 -812.874 -811.013 -799.498 
Industry, Year and Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,339 2,316 2,316 2,316 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All explanatory variables are lagged one year to pre-empt potential endogeneity issues.  
Monetary values are deflated using GDP deflators. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  Impact of foreign listing on capital market frictions  
Frontier model 
Dependent variable: Investment to capital ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log Tobin’s q 0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.041*** 
(0.009) 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
Log sales/capital[-1] -0.154*** 
(0.002) 
- 0.146*** 
(0.012) 
- 0.183*** 
(0.000) 
Log sales[-1]/capital[-2] 0.059*** 
(0.010) 
0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.097*** 
(0.000) 
Inefficiency equation 
Dependent variable: Inefficiency generated from frontier model 
Hypothesis 3 
Cross-listing -0.879*** 
(0.051) 
- 3.311*** 
(0.238) 
- 2.894*** 
(0.332) 
Cross-listing * Business Group -1.079*** 
(0.102) 
- 0.669*** 
(0.113) 
- 0.540*** 
(0.116) 
Cross-listing * Foreign Ownership -0.584*** 
(0.116) 
- 0.505*** 
(0.122) 
- 0.896*** 
(0.128) 
Hypothesis 4 
Cross-listing * Investor Protection  0.325*** 
(0.033) 
0.359*** 
(0.049) 
Control variables 
Firm age   -0.003** 
(0.001) 
Log assets   -0.185*** 
(0.017) 
Cash flow   1.32e-08 
(3.63e-08) 
Market cap to GDP   -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 3,474 3,232 2,937 
Note: Following Bhaumik et al. (2012), the frontier model and the inefficiency equation are estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood method. 
*** and ** indicates significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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